General two-party Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) allows mutually distrusting parties to correctly compute any function on their private input data, without revealing the inputs. Two-party SFE can benefit almost any client-server interaction where privacy is required, such as privacy-preserving credit checking, medical classification, or face recognition. Today, SFE is a subject of immense amount of research in a variety of directions and is not easy to navigate.
Introduction
The concept of two-party Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) was introduced in 1982 by Yao [121] . The idea is to let two mutually mistrusting parties compute an arbitrary function on their private inputs without revealing any information about their inputs beyond the output of the function. Since then, this concept has been an appealing research subject in crypto and security communities, with many exciting results.
Although a large number of security-critical applications (e.g., electronic auctions and voting, data classification, remote diagnostics, etc.) with sophisticated privacy and security requirements can benefit from SFE, its real-world deployment was believed to be very limited and expensive for a relatively long time. Fortunately, the cost of SFE has been dramatically reduced in the recent years thanks to many algorithmic improvements and automatic tools, as well as faster computing platforms and communication networks. Of course, SFE is only a part of the broad and vibrant field of cryptography, which includes addressing issues such as encryption and authentication, securing communication against third parties, etc.
Scope of this paper
In this paper we survey and systematize the current state of the art of practically efficient general secure two-party computation. In particular, we do not discuss in detail currently practically inefficient techniques, such as fully homomorphic encryption (we elaborate on its practicality in Section 4.1.2), nor do we cover specialized techniques applicable only to small classes of functions. We concentrate on techniques of the semi-honest model, to limit the scope of the exposition. For wellroundness, we do discuss the definitions and occasionally mention some approaches in other models; we stress that this is not at all comprehensive. We refer to [54] for an excellent presentation of different adversary models, generic, and specific techniques for efficient secure two-party computation. Moreover, as a methodological contribution, we present a framework which allows to modularly combine the required techniques with well-defined interfaces to obtain highly efficient protocols suitable for practical applications. We build our presentation in the style of a tutorial, and aim for the paper to be both a reference on practically efficient SFE for experts, and an understandable area guide for non-experts in secure computation.
Efficient SFE techniques
For several years, two different approaches for secure two-party computation have co-existed. One approach is based on homomorphic encryption (HE). Here one party sends its encrypted inputs to the other party, who then computes the intended function under encryption using the homomorphic properties of the cryptosystem, and sends back the encrypted result. Popular examples are the additively homomorphic cryptosystems of Paillier [101] and Damgård-Jurik [29] , and the recent fully homomorphic schemes [44, 113, 116] . (We elaborate on the practicality of fully homomorphic schemes in Section 4.1.2). Alternatively, SFE can be done using garbled functions (GF), a generalization of Yao's garbled circuits (GC) [122] which also covers the conceptually similar garbled OBDDs of [79] , that works as follows: one party (constructor) "encrypts" (or garbles) the function (using symmetric keys), the other party (evaluator) obliviously obtains the keys corresponding to both parties' inputs and the garbled function, and is able to decrypt the corresponding output value. Both approaches have their respective advantages and disadvantages. GF requires to transfer the garbled function (communication complexity is at least linear in the size of the function) but allows to pre-compute almost all expensive operations resulting in a low latency of the online phase, whereas most HE schemes require relatively expensive public-key operations but can result in a smaller overall communication complexity.
For a particular primitive, one of the techniques is usually more suitable than the other. For example, for comparison or maximum selection, GF [75, 97] is better than HE [26] [27] [28] , whereas multiplication often benefits from using HE. Therefore, simply switching from one approach for secure computation to the other can result in substantial performance improvements. For instance, for privacy-preserving DNA matching based on secure evaluation of finite automatons, GC-based [36] is more efficient than HE-based [114] . In many protocols, a mixture of both HE and GF results in the most efficient protocol where HE is used for linear transformations (involving additions and multiplications) and GF is used for the non-linear part of the computation, e.g., in [5, 9, 106] .
We also note that GCs are gaining popularity as a versatile tool whose applicability goes beyond the "simple" SFE [43, 72, 107] . Many published works (e.g., [50, 107] ) do not give concrete GC instantiations or constructions for how to hide the topology of the evaluated function (for which efficient universal circuit constructions are needed). This is, of course, expected, since they build on the existing GC foundations. We summarize today's most efficient constructions for garbled circuits and universal circuits in Section 4.3 of our paper.
We note that recently there has been interest [23, 99] in the GMW [49] SFE complier for Boolean circuits. [99] significantly improves the state of the art for malicious computation, but this protocol is slightly less efficient than GCs in the semi-honest setting [23] . In addition, the GMW compiler runs in the number of rounds linear in the depth of the computed circuit. We mention, but do not discuss the GMW approach in detail in this work.
It is not our goal to give concrete performance numbers for specific approaches. Firstly, many approaches are not implemented; in cases where implementation exists, it is often of proof-of-concept quality, and is not fully representative for an optimized solution implementing the same algorithm. Hence, we measure performance, as is typical in cryptography, in the number of executions of basic primitives and number of rounds. Nevertheless, to give a flavor of performance of the garbled circuit, we note that a recent implementation takes approximately 10 µs per gate on a standard PC [56] .
Composition and performance of efficient SFE techniques
Going one step further, we would like to benefit from the use of the most efficient primitive for the respective sub-task even if they are based on different paradigms. Indeed, secure and efficient composition of sub-protocols based on HE and GF can result in performance improvements as shown for several privacy-preserving applications (see, e.g., [5, 17, 19, 106] ). In these protocols, HE is often used for performing computations that involve many multiplications, e.g., for computing the Euclidean distance, while GF is used for computing non-linear operations, e.g., computing the minimum.
One of the goals of this work is the design and presentation of a unifying framework (Section 5), which allows for the above compositions in a modular way. The need for and the usefulness of this framework is illustrated by its recent (partial) implementation, "Tool for Automating Secure Two-Part Y Computations" (TASTY) [55] . TASTY allows a programmer to provide a high-level description of the computation to be performed on encrypted data in a domain-specific language, and automatically transforms this description into efficient protocols based on HE, GC, and arbitrary combinations of both. TASTY allows to compare the performance of different protocols with each other. For example, it may help determine (and quantify!) that GC-based multiplication has a more efficient online phase than HE-based multiplication for 16 bit values [55] .
Applications of SFE
There is a large body of literature on SFE applications, in particular those with strong privacy requirements such as Privacy-Preserving Genomic Computation [36, 69, 72, 114] , Remote Diagnostics [17] , Graph Algorithms [18] , Data Mining [83, 86] , Credit Checking [39] , Medical Diagnostics [5] , Face Recognition [35, 106] , or Policy Checking [37, 38, 40] , just to name a few. These applications are based on either HE or GF or a combination of both as explained before. Recently, verifiable outsourcing of computations for cloud-computing applications has been proposed, based on evaluating GCs under fully HE [43] . Existence of a variety of SFE compilers, coming from both academic, e.g., [55, 91, 93] , and industrial research, e.g., [12, 111] , further proves significant interest in the SFE technology.
Moreover, we note that secure two-party protocols can often be naturally extended to secure multi-party protocols. Examples include secure mobile agents which can be based on HE [108] and GC [22] , as well as privacy-preserving auction systems based on GC [97] or HE [26] . However, in this work, we do not address the issues of multi-party computation with more than two players. We mention, however, that the practical aspects of secure multi-party computation are also a vibrant field, e.g., [8, [10] [11] [12] 23, 30, 31, 63, 82] . We note that in-depth conceptual and, where possible, performance comparison of two-and multi-party computation is an open problem. 
Outline of the presentation
We start our discussion in Section 2 with a few of the most popular function representations and point out their relative advantages in terms of possibility of efficient secure evaluation. We note that it is possible to "mix-and-match" the representations in the construction of protocols. Then, in Section 3, we briefly discuss various notions of security and their relationship. In Section 4, we describe today's practically efficient SFE constructions for each of the function representations we consider. We handle the actual details of the composition, namely the techniques to convert encrypted intermediate values between the protocols in Section 5 for semi-honest players, a model which suits many client-server applications.
Function representations
Given the function to be securely computed, the first decision we face is the choice of the "programming language" for describing the function. It turns out that this decision has a major impact on the efficiency of the final solution. Further, it is not feasible to describe the optimal choice strategy as finding minimal function representations is hard [14, 70] .
The following standard representations for functions are particularly useful for SFE: Boolean circuits (cf. Fig. 1(a) ), arithmetic circuits (cf. Fig. 1(b) ), and ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDD) (cf. Fig. 1(c) ).
In this section, we give their detailed descriptions and provide guidelines regarding efficiency choices. We stress that the cost of implementing SFE protocols varies greatly among the function representations. For example, the GC technique for SFE of Boolean circuits is much more efficient than techniques for evaluating arithmetic circuits (e.g., using HE). However, some functions are represented much more compactly as an arithmetic circuit. As another example, some functions (e.g., decision We now discuss several major function representations used in SFE, and note their respective advantages, trade-offs, and use aspects.
Boolean circuits
Boolean circuits are a classical representation of functions in engineering and computer science.
A Boolean circuit with u inputs, v outputs and k gates is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with |V | = u + v + k vertices (nodes) and |E| edges. Each node corresponds to either a gate, an input, or an output. The edges are called wires. For simplicity, the input-and output nodes are often omitted in the graphical representation of a Boolean circuit as shown in Fig. 1 . For a more detailed definition see [118] .
. Typical gates are XOR (⊕), XNOR (=), AND (∧), OR (∨); gates are often specified by their function table, which contains 2 d entries.
Gates of a Boolean circuit can be evaluated in any order, as long as all of the current gate inputs are available. This property is ensured by sorting (and evaluating) the gates topologically, which can be done efficiently in O(|V | + |E|) [25] , pp. 549-552. The topologic order of a Boolean circuit indexes the gates with labels G 1 , . . . , G k and ensures that the ith gate G i has no inputs that are outputs of a successive gate G j>i . In complexity theory, a circuit with such a topologic order is called a straightline program [2] . Given the values of the inputs, the output of the Boolean circuit can be evaluated by evaluating the gates one-by-one in topologic order. A valid topologic order for the example Boolean circuit in Fig. 1(a) would be ∧, ⊕, ∨, =. The topologic order is not necessarily unique, e.g., ⊕, ∧, =, ∨ would be possible as well.
Automatic generation
Boolean circuits can be automatically generated from a high-level specification of the function. A prominent example is the well-established Fairplay compiler [8, 93] . circuit. Other candidates for automatic generation of Boolean circuits are the languages and tools provided by [55, 102] . As shown in [55, 95] , Boolean circuits can be generated with a low memory footprint.
Arithmetic circuits
Arithmetic circuits often offer a more compact function representation than Boolean circuits.
An arithmetic circuit over a ring R and the set of variables x 1 , . . . , x n is a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Figure 1(b) illustrates an example. Each node with in-degree zero is called an input gate labeled by either a variable x i or an element in R. Every other node is called a gate and labeled by either + or × denoting addition or multiplication in R.
Any Boolean circuit can be expressed as an arithmetic circuit over R = Z 2 . However, if we use R = Z m for sufficiently large modulus m, the arithmetic circuit can be much smaller than its corresponding Boolean circuit, as integer addition and multiplication can be expressed as single operations in Z m .
Number representation
We note that arithmetic circuits can simulate computations on both positive and negative integers by mapping them into elements of Z m as follows. Zero and positive values are mapped to the elements 0, 1, 2, . . . whereas negative values are mapped to m − 1, m − 2, . . . . As with all fixed precision arithmetics, overflows or underflows must be avoided.
Ordered binary decision diagrams
Another possibility to represent Boolean functions are Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) introduced by Bryant [20] .
A binary decision diagram (BDD) is a rooted, directed acyclic graph (DAG) which consists of decision nodes and two terminal nodes called 0-terminal and 1-terminal. Each decision node is labeled by a Boolean decision variable and has two child nodes, called low child and high child. The edge from a node to a low (high) child represents an assignment of the variable to 0 (1). An ordered binary decision diagram (OBDD) is a BDD in which the decision variables appear in the same order on all paths from the root node to a terminal node. Given an assignment x 1 ← b 1 , . . . , x n ← b n to the variables x 1 , . . . , x n , the value of the Boolean function f (b 1 , . . . , b n ) can be found by starting at the root and following the path where the edges on the path are labeled with b 1 , . . . , b n .
Example
Figure 1(c) shows the OBDD for the function f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) = (x 1 = x 2 ) ∧ (x 3 = x 4 ) of four variables x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 with the total ordering x 1 < x 2 < x 3 < x 4 . Consider the assignment shown in Fig. 1(c) , if we start at the root and follow the edges corresponding to the assignment, we end up at the 1-terminal which implies that f (1, 1, 0, 0) = 1. Note that OBDDs are sensitive to variable ordering, e.g., with the ordering x 1 < x 3 < x 2 < x 4 the OBDD for f would have 11 nodes.
Generalizations
Multiple OBDDs can be used to represent a function g with multiple outputs. If g's outputs can be encoded by k Boolean variables, then g can be represented by k OBDDs where the ith OBDD computes the ith output bit. Further generalizations of OBDDs can be obtained by having multiple terminal nodes (called classification nodes) and more general branching conditions. In a Branching Program as defined in [17] , Section 4.1, the child node is determined depending on the comparison of the -bit input variable x α i with a decision node specific threshold t i . In Linear Branching Programs as defined in [5] the branching condition is the comparison of the scalar product between the input vector x of n -bit values and a decision node specific coefficient vector a i with a decision node specific threshold t i .
Efficiency
Although some functions require in the worst case an OBDD of size exponential in the number of inputs (e.g., multiplication [21, 120] ), many functions encountered in typical applications (e.g., addition or comparison) have a reasonably small OBDD representation [20] . Even though finding an optimal variable ordering for OBDDs is NP-complete [14] , in many practical cases OBDDs can be minimized to a reasonable size. Algorithms to improve the variable ordering of OBDDs are Rudell's sifting algorithm [104] , the window permutation algorithm [41] , genetic algorithms [33, 81] , or algorithms based on simulated annealing [13] . Nevertheless, some functions have a lower bound for the size of the smallest OBDD representation which is exponential. For example -bit integer multiplication has an exponential size OBDD [21, 120] but requires only one multiplication gate in an arithmetic circuit over a sufficiently large ring. Multiplication within a Boolean circuit has complexity O( 2 ) using school method or O( log 2 3 ) using Karatsuba multiplication [71] (indeed, for garbled circuits the latter is more efficient already for 20 [55] ).
SFE: Security notions, parameters, notation, and intuition
In the following we describe the security notions (Section 3.1), parameters, and notations (Section 3.2) we use and give the general concept of computation under encryption (Section 3.3).
Security notions
In this section, we give the intuition of the security notions we use. Due to their size and complexity, we do not include the standard definitions here. However, we
Practically efficient two-party secure function evaluation protocols 291 present at the high-level the security guarantees provided by these definitions, as well as the intuition behind the simulation-based definitional approach. We refer the reader to standard sources for formal definitions and further discussion, e.g., [48, 86] . The definitions model semi-honest, covert and malicious behavior. The strongest and most general (and, perhaps, the most natural) notion is the malicious adversary. Such attacker is allowed to arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed protocol, aiming to learn private inputs of the parties and/or to influence the outcome of the computation. Not surprisingly, protection against such attacks is relatively expensive, as we discuss later in Section 4.2.3.
A somewhat weaker covert adversary is similar to malicious, but with the restriction that they must avoid being caught cheating. That is, a protocol in which an active attacker may gain advantage may still be considered secure if attacks are discovered with certain fixed probability (e.g., 1/2). It is reasonable to assume that in many social, political, and business scenarios the consequences of being caught outweigh the gain from cheating; we believe covert adversaries is the right way to model the behavior of players in many interactions of interest. At the same time, protocols secure against covert adversaries are substantially more efficient than those secure against malicious players, e.g., as summarized in Section 4.2.3.
Finally, we consider the semi-honest adversary, one who does not deviate from the protocol, but aims to learn the output of the computation. At first, it may appear contrived and trivial. Consideration of semi-honest adversaries, however, is important in many typical practical settings. Firstly, even externally unobservable cheating, such as poor random number generation, manipulations under encryption, etc., can be uncovered by an audit or reported by a conscientious insider, and cause negative publicity. Therefore, especially if the gain from cheating is low, it is often reasonable to assume that a well-established organization will exactly follow the protocol (and thus can be modeled as semi-honest). Further, even if players are trusted to be fully honest, it is sometimes desired to ensure that the transcript of the interaction reveals no information. This is because in many cases, it is not clear how to reliably delete the transcript due to lack of control of the underlying computing infrastructure (network caching, virtual memory, etc.). Running an SFE protocol ensures that player's input cannot be subsequently revealed even by forensic analysis.
At the same time, designing semi-honest-secure SFE protocols is far from trivial, and is in fact an important basic step in designing protocols secure against covert and malicious adversaries (cf. Section 4.2.3).
Hybrid security
It is often the case that players are not equal in their capabilities, trustworthiness, and motivation. This is true especially often in the client-server scenarios. For example, it may be reasonable to assume that the bank will not deviate from the protocol (act semi-honestly), but similar assumption cannot be made on bank clients, who may be much more willing to take the risks of committing fraud.
This can be naturally reflected in protocol design and the guarantees given by the protocol. This is because security definitions already separately state security against
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player A and player B. When proposing a protocol, the security claim may be in the form "Protocol Π is secure against malicious A and semi-honest B". The proof of security then involves two different definitions, and simulator constructions would also be correspondingly different. The benefit of this hybrid approach is the possibility to design significantly more efficient protocols. For example, the garbled circuit protocol (in which players take the roles of constructor or evaluator of garbled circuits) is almost free to secure against malicious evaluator, and much more expensive to secure against malicious constructor (details later in Section 4.2.3). Thus, GC-based protocols are good candidates for settings with corresponding trust relationships.
Simulatable security
Formal definitions of security of SFE are detailed (pages long) and subtle. Here we discuss the basic technical ideas of the simulatability and the ideal/real paradigm which are the core of the standard definitions. We do not discuss less standard models, such as fairness, which is reviewed e.g., in [54] , Section 1.1.
Intuitively, a protocol transcript (i.e., the sequence of messages exchanged between the parties) does not leak player's input, if an indistinguishable (i.e., similarlooking) transcript can be constructed without any knowledge of the input. (We note that the two transcripts, real and simulated, must look the same to a powerful distinguisher who, in particular, knows the inputs.) It is now intuitive that if the protocol leaks some information on the inputs, there will exist a distinguisher who simply extracts this information from the transcript and compares it with the player's input. Since the simulated transcript was constructed without the knowledge of the input, the distinguisher will be able to distinguish it from the real one, and such protocol will be insecure by definition. Further, the proof of security for players A and B in the protocol Π consists of constructing such simulators Sim A , Sim B , and proving that their output is indistinguishable from the real transcript of the protocol.
The above intuition is sufficient for the formalization of the semi-honest model. However, in the presence of actively cheating players (who can substitute their input, among other things), this does not quite work, as it is not even clear if the players indeed evaluate the intended function. Thus, the following extension of the simulation paradigm was introduced. We now define an ideal world, where players have very limited cheating powers (they are allowed to abort, substitute their local inputs, and output what they wish), and rely on a trusted party to provide them with the resulting output of the computation over a perfectly secure channel. We say that a real-world protocol Π is secure if for any real-world attacker there is a corresponding idealworld attacker that can do "the same harm". Since the ideal world clearly limits the attack powers, the same limit would apply to the real world. This is formalized by the ability to simulate the real-world transcript (i.e., to generate an indistinguishable transcript) by the ideal-world simulator.
The formal definitions for the semi-honest and malicious player security can be found in [48] .
The formalization of the covert adversaries is similar to that of the malicious; the difference is in the definition of the ideal world, where ideal world adversaries are given the option to cheat, but are caught (i.e., their opponent is notified) with certain fixed probability. Other aspects of definition remain the same; because of simulatability properties and the general approach of the ideal-real paradigm, a secure realworld covert adversary also may choose to cheat, but will be caught by the honest player with the specified probability. The formal definitions for covert security (three variations) were proposed in [4] . We note that SFE protocols will guarantee security for the honestly behaving player who may be engaging with the cheating adversary. If both players are deviating from the protocol, definitions provide no guarantees.
Parameters and notation
We denote the symmetric security parameter by t and the asymmetric security parameter, e.g., bitlength of RSA moduli, by T . From 2011 on, NIST recommends at least t = 112 and T = 2048. For detailed recommendations on the choice of security parameters we refer to [47] . The statistical security parameter is denoted by σ and can be set to σ = 80 or σ = 40 depending on the application. The bitlength of x is written |x|.
In the following, we refer to the two SFE participants as client C and server S. Our naming choice is mainly influenced by the asymmetry in the SFE protocols, which fits into the client-server model. We stress that, while in most of the real-life twoparty SFE scenarios the corresponding client-server relationship in fact exists in the evaluated function, we do not limit ourself to this setting.
Computation under encryption
Before presenting the protocols in the next section, we find it instructive to present the following simple insight: each of the SFE techniques we consider can be viewed as evaluation under encryption with hints.
Evaluation under encryption is very complicated in its generality. In fact, only recently the first promising candidate was proposed -an encryption scheme that allows to perform an arbitrary number of both multiplications and additions on the plaintext [44] (more details later in Section 4.1.2). We stress that this and similar schemes are currently prohibitively expensive, and are not likely to be considered for practice at least in the near and medium term (see Section 4.1 for more discussion). In comparison, we propose extremely efficient solutions to a much simpler problem, where the computed function is fixed. Now, for example, the first player can send his encrypted input and additional function-specific "hints" to assist the second player with evaluation under encryption. This assistance can also be interactive. We further simplify our work by considering only elementary operations, e.g., Boolean gates, and show how to compose their evaluation in a secure way. 
SFE of circuits and OBDDs in the semi-honest model
To reduce complexity, functions can be decomposed into several sub-functions (blocks). Each of these blocks can be represented in its own way, e.g., a multiplication block can be represented as an arithmetic circuit, a comparison block as a Boolean circuit, and a specific decision tree as an OBDD.
In this section, we present the SFE protocols for the three representations of interest with semi-honest adversaries.
It is our goal to be able to arbitrarily compose the three protocols. This, in particular, means that the encrypted output of one protocol will be fed as input into another. To preserve a common interface and simplify the presentation, we will extract and describe separately the core -computation under encryption -of each protocol (done in this section). For completeness, we also discuss here the simple issue of how to appropriately encrypt the inputs and decrypt the outputs. We will discuss the issues of composition of the protocols, such as conversions of encryptions, in Section 5. Overall, the protocol structure will look as follows: (i) encrypt the plaintext inputs, (ii) perform the computation under encryption (which may include a composition of encrypted computations) and (iii) decrypt the output values.
Homomorphic encryption: SFE of arithmetic circuits
In this section, we describe semantically secure homomorphic encryption schemes and how they can be used for secure evaluation of arithmetic circuits. Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with plaintext space P and ciphertext space C. We write [[m] ] for Enc(m, r).
Additively homomorphic cryptosystems
An additively homomorphic encryption scheme allows addition under encryption as follows. It defines an operation + on plaintexts and a corresponding operation on ciphertexts, satisfying ∀x,
. This naturally allows for multiplication with a plaintext constant a using repeated doubling and adding:
Popular instantiations for additively homomorphic encryption schemes are summarized in Table 1 , The Paillier cryptosystem [101] provides a T -bit plaintext space, where T is the size of the RSA modulus N , and is sufficient for most applications. The Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem [29] is a generalization of the Paillier cryptosystem which provides a large plaintext space of size sT -bit for arbitrary s 1. The cryptosystems of Damgård-Geisler-Krøigaard (DGK) [26] [27] [28] and lifted ECElGamal [34] (implemented over an elliptic curve group G with prime order p) have smaller ciphertexts, but are restricted to a small plaintext space Z u (respectively a small subset of the plaintext space Z p ) as decryption requires to solve a discrete log. 
Notes: N -RSA modulus, s 1, u -small prime, p -large prime.
Fully homomorphic cryptosystems
For completeness, we mention that some cryptosystems allow both addition and multiplication under encryption. For this, a separate operation × for multiplication of plaintexts and a corresponding operation on ciphertexts is defined satisfying ∀x, y ∈ P :
. Cryptosystems with such a property are called fully homomorphic.
Until recently, it was widely believed that such cryptosystems do not exist. Several works provided partial solutions: [15, 46] allow for an arbitrary number of additions and one multiplication, and ciphertexts of [3, 109] grow exponentially in the number of multiplications. While one-multiplication schemes are relatively efficient, their use is limited due to their inherent restriction. Recent schemes [44, 113, 116] are fully homomorphic. However, the size of ciphertexts and computational cost of elementary steps in fully homomorphic schemes are dramatically larger than those of additively homomorphic schemes.
Recently, the first working implementation of fully homomorphic encryption was presented [45] . Its performance for reasonable security parameters is in the order of Gigabytes of communication and minutes of computation on high-end IBM System x3500 servers. Other recent implementation results of [113] show that even for very small parameters where the multiplicative depth of the evaluated circuit is bounded by d = 2, i.e., up to two multiplications, encrypting a single bit takes 386 ms on a 2.4 GHz Intel Core2 (6600) CPU. At the same time, there are applications where it is sufficient to perform only a few multiplications under encryption. For this purpose, so called "somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes", the schemes from which fully homomorphic encryption schemes are bootstrapped, can be used [32, 80] .
Significant effort is underway in the research community to improve performance of FHE. For example, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) currently funds the PROgramming Computation on EncryptEd Data (PROCEED) project, which aims at making fully homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computations more practical. At the same time, it seems unlikely that fully homomorphic encryption would very soon approach the efficiency of current public-key encryption schemes. Intuitively, this is because a fully homomorphic cryptosystem must provide the same strong security guarantees, while, at the same time, possessing extra algebraic structure to allow for homomorphic operations. The extra structure weakens security, and countermeasures (costing performance) are necessary. Further, the main benefit and distinction of fully homomorphic encryption is the non-interactivity of computation, which is not a critical goal in our discussion. In this work, we do not rely on, but could use, (currently expensive) fully or somewhat homomorphic schemes.
Computing on encrypted data
Homomorphic encryption is a natural choice to evaluate arithmetic circuits via computation on encrypted data, as follows. The client C generates a key pair for a homomorphic cryptosystem and sends his inputs encrypted under the public key to the server S together with the public key. With a fully homomorphic scheme, S can simply evaluate the arithmetic circuit by computing on the encrypted data and send back the (encrypted) result to C, who then decrypts it to obtain the output. If the homomorphic encryption scheme only supports addition, one round of interaction between C and S is needed to evaluate each multiplication gate (or a layer of multiplication gates) as described later in Section 4.1.5. Today, the interactive approach results in much faster SFE protocols than using fully homomorphic schemes. (The latter, however, allows non-interactive evaluation of private functions by S; this can be done efficiently without fully HE, but with interaction, using universal circuits as shown in Section 4.3.3.)
Packing
Often it is known from the structure of the protocol that the size of an element |x i | is substantially smaller than the plaintext space P of the homomorphic encryption scheme. This allows for optimization of many HE-based protocols by packing together multiple ciphertexts (each encrypting a small value) into one before or after additive blinding and sending the single ciphertext from S to C instead. This substantially decreases the message size and the number of decryptions performed by C. The computational overhead for S is small as packing the ciphertexts [[
] costs at most one full-range modular exponentiation by using Horner's scheme:
Homomorphic values and conversions
We mention a few relatively simple issues and optimizations with encrypting the input, and decrypting the output of the homomorphic computation. Describing these procedures completes (at a high level) the description of SFE of arithmetic circuits.
The interface for SFE protocols based on homomorphic encryption are homomorphic values, i.e., homomorphic encryptions held by S encrypted under the public key of C (see Fig. 3 
Garbled functions: SFE of Boolean circuits and OBDDs
Efficient techniques for evaluating Boolean circuits and OBDDs are quite similar; in fact the underlying idea is the same. In this section we will present the main idea and a complete high-level treatment of the two protocols. We then present the corresponding details for SFE of Boolean circuits in Section 4.3 and OBDDs in Section 4.4.
The idea for SFE, going back to Yao [122] , is to evaluate the function, step by basic step, under encryption. Yao's approach, which considered Boolean circuits, is to encrypt (or garble) each wire with a symmetric encryption scheme. In contrast to homomorphic encryption (cf. Section 4.1), the encryptions/garblings here cannot be operated on without additional help. We will explain in detail how to operate under encryption on the basic function steps in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
We now proceed to describe at the high level Yao's technique, and present the state of the art in the crypto primitives the method relies on. Following Yao's terminology, we talk about garbled functions, as the generalization of garbled (Boolean) circuits and garbled OBDDs.
To securely evaluate a function f , the constructor (server S) creates a garbled function f from f (a detailed description on how this is done is given later in Sec- We stress that a garbled function f cannot be re-used, and each secure evaluation requires construction and transfer of a new garbled function. While this can be done in a pre-computation phase (see also discussion in Section 4.3.1), the costs are not amortized by this pre-computation. A formal treatment of the properties achieved by garbled functions was given recently in [7] .
Garbled values and conversions
For garbled functions, conversions between plaintext values and encryptions involve a number of subtleties and tricks. Recall, we first convert both players' plain inputs into their corresponding garbled values (encrypt inputs), then evaluate the garbled function (evaluate under encryption), and finally convert the garbled outputs back into plain values (decrypt result).
The interface for SFE protocols based on garbled functions are garbled values (see Fig. 3 in Section 5). A garbled Boolean value x i represents a bit x i . Each garbled Boolean value x i = k i , π i consists of a key k i ∈ {0, 1} t , where t is the symmetric security parameter, and a permutation bit π i ∈ {0, 1}. The garbled value x i is assigned to one of the two corresponding garbled values
The permutation bit π i allows efficient evaluation of the garbled function using the so-called point-and-permute technique [97] (we give more details in Section 4.3.1). Of course, a garbled -bit value can be viewed as a vector of garbled Boolean values.
We show how to convert a plain value into its corresponding garbled value and back next.
Garbled value to plain value for outputs.
To convert a garbled value x i = k i , π i into its corresponding plain value x i for evaluator C, constructor S reveals the output permutation bit π 0 i which was used during construction of the garbled wire and C obtains x i = π i ⊕ π 0 i . If the garbled value x i should be converted into a plain value for constructor S, evaluator C simply sends x i (or π i ) to S who obtains the plain value by decrypting it, e.g., compare with x 0 i and x 1 i . We note that malicious C cannot cheat in this conversion as he only knows either x 0 i or x 1 i , but is unlikely to guess the other one.
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Plain value to garbled value for inputs. To translate a plain value x i held by S into a garbled value x i for C, S sends the corresponding garbled value x 0 i or x 1 i to C depending on the value of x i .
To convert a plain value x i held by C into a garbled value x i for C, both parties execute an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol where C inputs x i , S inputs x 0 i and x 1 i , and the output to C is x i = x 0 i if x i = 0 or x 1 i otherwise. In the following we describe how OT can be implemented efficiently in practice.
Oblivious transfer
Parallel 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) of n t -bit strings (where t = t + 1 is the length of garbled values for symmetric security parameter t), denoted as OT n t , is a two-party protocol run between a chooser (client C) and a sender (server S) as shown in Fig , whereas S learns nothing about C's choices b i . As described above, OT is used to convert plain values of C into corresponding garbled values.
Efficient OT protocols. OT n t can be instantiated efficiently with different protocols [1, 89, 96] . We refer to [54] , Chapter 7, for a detailed description of practically efficient OT protocols. For example the protocol of [1] implemented over a suitably chosen elliptic curve using point compression has communication complexity n(6(2t + 1)) + (2t + 1) ∼ 12nt bits and is secure against malicious C and semihonest S in the standard model (based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption) as described in [75] . Similarly, the protocol of [96] has communication complexity n(2(2t + 1) + 2t ) ∼ 6nt bits and is secure against malicious C and semi-honest S in the random oracle model (based on the Diffie-Hellman assumption). Both protocols require O(n) scalar point multiplications and two messages (C → S → C).
Extending OT efficiently. The extensions of [60] can be used to reduce the number of computationally expensive public-key operations of OT n t to be independent of n. (This is the reason for our choice of notation OT n t instead of n × OT t .) The transformation for semi-honest C reduces OT n t to OT t t and a small additional overhead: one additional message, 2n(t + t) bits additional communication, and O(n) invocations of a correlation robust hash function such as SHA-256 (2n for S and n for C) which is substantially cheaper than O(n) asymmetric operations. A brief summary of the OT extension construction of [60] optimized for pre-computations is given in [58] , Appendix. Constructions for OT extension with security against malicious adversaries are given in [53, 60, 98, 99] . In some computation-sensitive applications, the technique of [60] provides a critical performance improvement by getting rid of expensive public-key operations. We strongly recommend using it for functions with many/large inputs, possibly in conjunction with the following pre-computations.
Pre-computing OT. All computationally expensive operations for OT can be shifted into a setup phase by pre-computing OT [6] : In the setup phase the parallel OT protocol is run on randomly chosen values. Then, in the online phase, C uses its randomly chosen values r i to mask his private inputs b i , and sends them to S. S replies with encryptions of his private inputs s i ⊕ m i . Overall, the online phase consists of two messages of size n bits and 2nt bits, respectively, and negligible computation (XOR of bitstrings).
Covert and malicious adversaries
SFE protocols based on garbled functions can be easily protected against covert or malicious client C, by using an OT protocol with corresponding security.
Standard SFE protocols with garbled functions which additionally protect against covert [4, 51] or malicious [84] server S rely on the following cut-and-choose technique: S creates multiple garbled functions f i , deterministically derived from random seeds s i , and commits to each, e.g., by sending f i or Hash( f i ) to C. In the covert case, C asks S to open all but one garbled function I by revealing the corresponding s i =I . For all opened functions, C computes f i and checks that they match the commitments. The malicious case is similar, but C asks S to open 3/5 of the functions [112] , evaluates the remaining ones and chooses the majority of their results. Additionally, it must be guaranteed that S's input into OT is consistent with the GCs as pointed out in [74] , e.g., using committed, committing, or cut-and-choose OT [87] . The practical performance of cut-and-choose-based GC protocols was investigated experimentally in [88, 103] of RAM connected by gigabit ethernet takes approximately 0.5 MB data transfer and 7 s for semi-honest, 8.7 MB/1 min for covert, and 400 MB/19 min for malicious adversaries [103] . In fact, an optimized implementation that uses the combination of OT optimizations of Section 4.2.2 allows to reduce the online time for secure evaluation of AES in the semi-honest case from 5 s to 0.5 s as shown in [55] . Further optimizations can be achieved by streaming (cf. Section 4.3.1). The most recent implementation result on cut-and-choose-based GC protocols [78] exploits massive parallelism in a grid computing infrastructure and reports secure evaluation of AES with security against malicious adversaries in 1.1 s using 256 machines on each side. For completeness, note that cut-and-choose may be avoided with some SFE schemes, e.g., [64] , which use zero-knowledge proofs of correctness of the circuit construction, and operate on committed inputs [42] . An alternative approach is the soldering approach taken in [100] . However, the elementary steps of these protocols involve public-key operations for each gate. Hence, as estimated by [103] , such malicious-secure protocols often require substantially more computation than garbled functions/cut-and-choose-based protocols.
We further note that there are yet other approaches to malicious security, e.g., the IPS compiler [62] that compiles a secure multi-party computation protocol into a two-party SFE protocol. Optimizations and a concrete efficiency analysis of this protocol are given in [82] .
A recent very efficient approach for security against malicious adversaries is described in [99] . Their protocol combines the GMW protocol [49] with OT extensions similar to those summarized in Section 4.2.2. For big enough circuits, their approach can evaluate more than 20,000 gates per second, or takes 3 s for performing 27 secure evaluations of AES in parallel.
We mention, but do not discuss in detail the approach of [94] , where the authors define and construct very efficient protocols secure against malicious players at the cost of leaking one bit of information. This notion of security is weaker than malicious security and incomparable to covert. As demonstrated in [57] , this protocol can be implemented with only a slight overhead over the semi-honest version of the SFE protocol using two threads on each side.
Garbled circuits: SFE of Boolean circuits
We now turn to presenting the Boolean-circuit-specific details for SFE of garbled functions as introduced in [122] and excellently presented in [85] . Recall, in Section 4.2 we left out the method of step-by-step creation of the garbled function f and its evaluation given the garblings of the input wires. In the following we describe how the garbled circuit is constructed and evaluated.
To construct the garbled circuit C for a given Boolean circuit C, constructor S assigns to each wire W i of the circuit two random-looking garbled values w 0 i , w 1 iencryptions of 0 and 1 on that wire. We now show how to perform a basic stepto evaluate a gate G i under encryption. That is, given two garblings (one for each
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of the two inputs of the gate), we need to obtain the garbling of the output wire consistently with the gate function. Here the constructor S gives help to the evaluator C in the form of a garbled table T i with the following property: given a set of garbled values of G i 's inputs, T i allows to recover the garbled value of the corresponding G i 's output, but nothing else. This is easily done as follows. There are only four possible input combinations (and their garblings). The garbled table will consist of four entries, each of which is an encryption under a pair of input wire garblings of the corresponding output garbling. Clearly, this allows the evaluator to compute G i under encryption, and it can be shown that T i does not leak any information [85] . This method is composable s.t. the entire Boolean circuit can be evaluated gateby-gate. This technique also applies to gates with more than two inputs, but the size of garbled tables grows exponentially in the number of gate inputs.
The above is a simple description of Yao's technique. Today, a number of optimizations exist, which we survey next (but do not discuss in detail).
Efficient garbled circuit constructions
A summary of several constructions for garbled circuits is shown in Table 2 . In the following we concentrate on the currently most efficient technique for garbled circuits, Garbled Row Reduced Free XOR (GRRFX) of [103] , which combines free XOR gates of [76] with garbled row reduction of [97] . This technique requires less communication than the secret-sharing based technique of [103] as soon as more than 33% of the circuit's gates are XOR gates. This is achieved in almost all cases when applying the optimization techniques of [103] (see below). However, it can be proven secure only under a slightly stronger assumption than the standard model.
The GRRFX technique of [103] allows "free" evaluation of XOR gates from [76] , i.e., a garbled XOR gate has no garbled table (no communication) and its evaluation consists of XOR-ing its garbled input values to obtain the garbled output value (negligible computation).
The other gates, referred to as non-XOR gates, are evaluated with a combination of the point-and-permute technique and the garbled row reduction technique of [97] function such as SHA-256 in the random oracle model. 2 Later, for evaluation of a garbled d-input non-XOR gate, the evaluator needs only 1 invocation of the hash function as the correct entry to decrypt is determined by the permutation bits of the gate's input wires. Indeed, all known efficient GC constructions listed in Table 2 require exactly this number of hash invocations.
Circuit optimizations. As the costs of GC constructions for creating and transferring garbled tables grow exponentially in d, it is beneficial to optimize the circuit such that gates have small degree d while exploiting free XOR gates as much as possible. [88] propose to encode circuit components with d inputs consisting of multiple 2-input gates by a single d-input gate. Afterwards, when XOR gates are "free", these d-input gates are decomposed into 2-input gates while minimizing the number of non-XOR gates [103] .
Hardware-based SFE. We note that the transfer of garbled tables can be avoided entirely when server S can send to client C a tamper-proof hardware token that generates the garbled circuit on behalf of S. The token needs to compute only symmetric key primitives, processes the gates one-by-one using a constant amount of memory, and does not need to be trusted by C [67] . Another direction for improving SFE protocols is to use a cryptographic coprocessor for costly operations [59, 68] . Using trusted hardware also allows to implement OT non-interactively, called one-time programs in combination with GC [50, 52, 68] .
Pre-computation vs. streaming. We note that most GC-based SFE implementations (e.g., [55, 88, 93, 97, 103] ) follow the compilation paradigm, in which the circuit is first compiled from a high-level description and then optimized for size (see above). Although this approach requires storage linear in the size of the circuit, it is beneficial when the function is fixed and the compilation (and possibly GC creation) can be done in a pre-computation phase. When pre-computation is not feasible (e.g., in scenarios where parties make ad-hoc decisions when and what to compute securely), it is also possible to generate the circuit and its garbling with constant storage/memory: Firstly, the circuit can be compiled on-the-fly using a constant amount of memory as implemented in [55] (see discussion in the full version of [55] ). Further, this stream of gates can be directly combined with the constant-memory GC creation technique of [67] , and the garbled tables can be streamed directly over the network to the evaluator who evaluates them on-the-fly [56, 68] . Finally, OT can be extended on-the-fly as mentioned in [60] , s.t. only a constant (in the security parameter) number of public key operations is needed for an arbitrary (and unknown in advance) number of OTs. We note, however, that some circuits cannot be streamed as their evaluation requires memory linear in the circuit size [66] . The recently proposed VMCrypt library [92] as well as [56] specifically aim to maximize GC streaming. The currently fastest implementation of garbled circuits in the semi-honest setting is implemented in Java and takes approximately 10 µs per gate [56] . Instead of compiling the entire function into a circuit first, these libraries generate sub-circuits on-the-fly. The tech- Subtraction, comparison [75] Multiplexer [76] Minimum/maximum value + index a of n -bit values [75] 2 (n − 1) + (n + 1)
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Permute n bits [76, 119] n log n − n + 1
Select v from u v bits [76, 77] u+3v 2 log v + u − 2v + 1 Textbook multiplication [75] 2 2 − Fast multiplication [55] 9 1.6 − 13 − 34 a When only the minimum/maximum value needs to be computed but not the index, the circuit size is 2 (n − 1) as described in [58] .
niques described above as well as the "use cheapest SFE block" approach advocated in our work can be also used with their architectures, resulting in corresponding performance improvements.
Efficient circuit constructions with free XOR
As XOR gates can be evaluated "for free", the circuits to be evaluated can be optimized so that the number of non-XOR gates is minimized as described above. These tricks can improve many basic functions, some of which are summarized in Table 3 . For example, addition, subtraction and comparison have cheap circuit representations (linear in the size of the inputs). Also selecting the minimum or maximum value of n values together with its index (the function evaluated in a first-price auction [97] ) has linear overhead. Permuting (without duplicates) or selecting (with duplicates) n bits grows like O(n log n) and hence is feasible as well. In contrast, multiplication has a relatively expensive circuit representation. Fast multiplication [71] with complexity O( 1.6 ) is more efficient than O( 2 ) textbook multiplication for 20 [55] .
Private circuits
In some applications the evaluated function is known by one party only and should be kept secret from the other party. This can be achieved by securely evaluating a Universal Circuit (UC) which can be programmed to simulate any circuit C and hence entirely hides C (besides the number of inputs, number of gates, and number of outputs). Efficient UC constructions to simulate circuits consisting of k 2-input gates are given in [77, 115] . Generalized UCs of [105] can simulate circuits consisting of d-input gates. Which UC construction is favorable depends on the size of the simulated functionality: Small circuits can be simulated with the UC construction of [105] with overhead O(k 2 ) gates, medium-size circuits benefit from the construction of [77] with overhead O(k log 2 k) gates, and for very large circuits the construction of [115] with overhead O(k log k) gates is most efficient. Explicit sizes and a detailed analysis of the break-even points between these constructions are given in [105] While UCs entirely hide the structure of the evaluated functionality f , it is sometimes sufficient to hide f only within a class of topologically equivalent functionalities F; this is called secure evaluation of a semi-private function f ∈ F. The circuits for many standard functionalities are topologically equivalent and differ only in the specific function tables, e.g., comparison (<, >, =, . . .) or addition/subtraction. It is possible to directly evaluate the circuit and avoid the overhead of UC for semi-private functions as GC constructions of [93, 97] completely hide the type of the gates from evaluator C [37] [38] [39] [40] 102] .
Garbled OBDDs: SFE of OBDDs
OBDDs can be evaluated securely in a way analogous to garbled circuits, as first described in [79] . We base our presentation on the natural extension of [79] described in [110] , Section 3.4.1, and [5] , which also offers a (slight) performance improvement. Alternative approaches [61, 90] based on homomorphic encryption have smaller communication overhead, but put more computational load on S (public-key operations instead of symmetric operations for each decision node).
We now turn to presenting the OBDD-specific details for SFE of garbled functions. Recall, in Section 4.2 we left out the method of step-by-step creation of the garbled function f and its evaluation given the garblings of the input wires. In the following we describe how the garbled OBDD is constructed and evaluated. We note that the technique is somewhat similar to that of GCs described in Section 4.3.
Create garbled OBDD
In the pre-computation phase, S generates a garbled version O of the OBDD O. For this, the OBDD is first extended with dummy nodes to ensure that each evaluation path traverses the same number of variables in the same order resulting in evaluation paths of equal length. Further, OBDD nodes are randomly permuted to prevent leaking information from the sequence of steps taken by the evaluator (the start node P 1 remains the first node in O). Then, each decision node P i , labeled with Boolean variable x j , is converted into a garbled node P i in O, as follows. A randomly chosen key Δ i ∈ R {0, 1} t is associated with each node P i . Node's information (pointers to the two successor nodes, and their encryption keys) is encrypted with the node's key Δ i . To preserve security, we ensure that Δ i is only revealed to the evaluator, if this node is reached by executing on the parties' inputs. Processing/evaluating an OBDD node is simply following the pointer to one of the two child nodes, depending on the input. Since we must prevent the evaluator from following both successor nodes, we additionally encrypt left (resp. right) successor information with the garbling of the 0-value (resp. 1-value) of P i 's decision variable x j .
Evaluate garbled OBDD
It is now easy to see the corresponding OBDD evaluation procedure. C receives the garbled OBDD O from S, and evaluates it locally on the garbled values x 1 , . . . , x n and obtains the garbled value z that corresponds to the result z = O(x 1 , . . . , as follows. C traverses the garbled OBDD O by decrypting garbled decision nodes along the evaluation path starting at P 1 . At each node P i , C takes the garbled input value x i = k i , π i together with the node's key Δ i to decrypt the information needed to continue evaluation of the garbled successor node until the garbled output value z for the corresponding terminal node is obtained.
Implementation observations and optimizations
The employed semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme can be instantiated as Enc s k (m) = m ⊕ H(k||s), where s is a unique identifier used once, and H(k||s) is a pseudo-random function (PRF) evaluated on s and keyed with k, e.g., a cryptographic hash function from the SHA-2 family. Additionally the following technical improvement from [79] can be used: instead of encrypting twice (sequentially, with Δ i and k j i ), the successor P i j 's data can be encrypted with Δ i ⊕ k j i . The terminal nodes are garbled simply by including their corresponding garbled output value ( z 0 for the 0-terminal or z 1 for the 1-terminal) into the parent's node (instead of the decryption key Δ i ).
Efficiency
To evaluate the garbled OBDD O, the cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-256) is invoked once per decision node along the evaluation path.
The garbled OBDD O for an OBDD with d decision nodes (after extension to evaluation paths of equal length) contains d garbled nodes P i consisting of two ciphertexts of size log d + t + 1 bits each. The size of O is 2d( log d + t + 1) ∼ 2d(log d + t) bits. Overall, creation of O requires 2d invocations of a cryptographic hash function.
Private OBDDs
The garbled OBDD reveals only a small amount of information about the evaluated OBDD to C, namely the total number d of decision nodes. We note that in many cases this is acceptable. If not, this information can be hidden by appropriate padding with dummy-nodes.
Composition of SFE blocks
We now show how to convert encryptions of intermediate values between the different representations that are used in the three protocols we described. Done securely, this allows arbitrary compositions of the three techniques, and implies significant improvements to SFE.
We had already described the conversions between the plaintext values and encryptions. These conversions are only applicable for input encryption and output decryption. Intermediate values in the protocol must be converted without ever being decrypted entirely. In the following we describe how to efficiently convert between the two types of encryptions.
Garbled values to homomorphic values
A garbled -bit value x held by C (usually obtained from evaluating a garbled function) can be efficiently converted into a homomorphic value held by S by using additive blinding or bitwise encryption as described next.
Additive blinding
S randomly chooses a random mask r ∈ R {0, 1} +σ , where σ is the statistical security parameter and + σ |P | to avoid an overflow, and adds the random mask converted into garbled value r to x using a garbled ( + σ)-bit addition circuit that computes X with X = x + r. This value is converted into a plain output value X for C who homomorphically encrypts this value and sends the result 
Bitwise encryption
If the bitlength of x is small, a bitwise approach can be used as well in order to avoid the garbled addition circuit: C homomorphically encrypts the permutation bits 
Performance comparison
The conversion based on additive blinding requires a garbled addition circuit for bit value r, i.e., ( + σ)(t + 1) bits (cf. Section 4.2.1). When using the efficient GC technique described in Section 4.3.1, this requires in total 4( + σ)(t + 1) bits sent from S to C in the pre-computation phase. In the online phase, the garbled circuit is evaluated and the result is homomorphically encrypted and sent to S (one ciphertext). The conversion using bitwise encryption requires homomorphic encryptions and transfer of ciphertexts from C to S in the online phase. At least for converting a single bit, i.e., when = 1, this technique results in better performance.
Homomorphic values to garbled values
In the following we describe how to convert a homomorphic -bit value [[x] ] into a garbled value x. This protocol has been widely used to combine homomorphic encryption with garbled functions, e.g., in [5, 17, 19, 65] .
S ] to C who decrypts and inputs the least significant bits of X, χ = X mod 2 , to an -parallel OT protocol to obtain the corresponding garbled value χ. Then, the mask is taken off within a garbled -bit subtraction circuit which gets as inputs χ and ρ converted from ρ = r mod 2 as input from S. The output obtained by C is x which corresponds to x = X − r = χ − ρ. 3 Again, packing as described in Section 4.1.4 can be used to improve efficiency of parallel conversions from homomorphic to garbled values by packing multiple ciphertexts together before additive blinding and sending them to C.
Conclusion
We conclude with a summary of past, present, and possible future directions in practically efficient SFE.
Where we've come from
Although the theoretical foundations of SFE have been laid over two decades ago, until recently, SFE was seen merely as a theoretical concept. Around ten years ago first SFE implementations were reported, and new primitives, such as efficient additively homomorphic encryption, have been proposed. About five years ago, coinciding with the availability of general SFE tools, a variety of privacy-preserving protocols started appearing in the research area of security, and real-life applications became within reach. In 2008 came a first major deployment of secure computationits use in executing a nation-wide sugar beets auction in Denmark [12] . 
Where we are
Today, we are on the verge of SFE gaining widespread recognition and use. Even now, the efficiency of existing protocols allows for business justification of its use in a number of scenarios. At the same time, both theoretical and applied research in SFE are experiencing a great surge in anticipation of its success. A variety of SFE techniques and their prototype implementations already exist, each with its advantages and disadvantages -in this survey we have summarized today's most efficient approaches for generic SFE and presented a unified framework in which these can be arbitrarily combined.
Where we may be going
With the growth of the web and social networking came the realization of the value of privacy. Governments are introducing far-reaching restrictions on data collection and use, especially in the personal health domain. SFE is a clear candidate to help achieve privacy, while enabling a variety of applications. (Of course, no single technology, not even powerful primitives such as fully homomorphic encryption, can be used as a universal solution for private computing. This is due to both impossibility results [117] and the cost barriers raised by some SFE techniques. Instead, a comprehensive approach would include SFE, secure hardware, hardened code, legal agreements, etc.) With the political and business need in place, the Moore's-law performance improvements of hardware and expected algorithmic improvements, it is clear that SFE's use will be practically justified in more and more of security-and privacy-critical applications. In the longer term, fully homomorphic encryption may become practically efficient, and enable new opportunities.
We hope that our work serves to promote secure computation beyond theoretical research communities, and helps facilitate its earlier and broader practical use. 
